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ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM:
WHY “LIMITED LOCKSTEP” BETRAYS OUR
SYSTEM OF FEDERALISM
TIMOTHY P. O’NEILL*
This Symposium celebrates the significance of the Illinois
Constitution. Yet the Illinois Supreme Court has ironically chosen
to make the Illinois Constitution completely insignificant in
several areas of constitutional law. It has accomplished this
through “the limited lockstep doctrine.” This approach is used to
interpret cognate provisions of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions.
The Illinois Supreme Court describes the doctrine in this way:
[W]hen the language of the provisions within our state
and federal constitutions is nearly identical, departure
from the United States Supreme Court’s construction of
the provision will generally be warranted only if we find
‘in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and
the committee reports of the constitutional convention,
something which will indicate that the provisions of our
constitution are intended to be construed differently
than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution,
after which they are patterned.’ 1
The Illinois Supreme Court has applied this to a number of
state constitutional provisions. 2
Two excellent new articles by James K. Leven 3 and the

* Professor, The John Marshall Law School.
1. Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 47 (quoting
People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226, 245 (1984)).
2. See Hope Clinic, 2013 IL 112673 at ¶¶ 50, 92 (applying the limited
lockstep doctrine to due process and equal protection, respectively); see also
People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 297 (2006) (applying the limited lockstep
doctrine to issues arising under the Fourth Amendment); see additionally
People v. Levin, 157 Ill.2d 138, 160 (1993) (holding that the Illinois
Constitution offers no broader protection than the Federal Constitution with
respect to double jeopardy); People v. Perry, 147 Ill.2d 430, 436 (1992)
(adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination as coextensive with that guaranteed by the
Illinois Constitution).
3. James K. Leven, A Roadmap to State Judicial Independence Under
the Illinois Limited Lockstep Doctrine Predicated on the Intent of the Framers
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and Illinois Tradition, 62 DE PAUL L. REV . 63
(2012).
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Honorable John Christopher Anderson 4 critique “limited lockstep”
from multiple angles. This Essay, however, approaches the subject
from only one relatively narrow perspective: what makes this odd
doctrine so attractive to the Illinois Supreme Court? In answering
this question, it contends that the use of lockstep flouts basic
principles central to the effective running of the federal system.
Limited lockstep can be characterized as a type of legal
formalism. Richard Posner, in his recent book Reflections on
Judging, notes that “[t]he character of legal formalism can be
captured in such slogans as ‘the law made me do it.’” 5 The legal
formalist sees law as largely a “compendium of texts”—e.g.,
statutes, constitutions, regulations—and rules. 6 The text and rules
drive the answer—and there is only one right answer. 7 The ruledriven legal formalist judge can effectively disown personal
responsibility for a legal decision. 8
According to Posner, formalism’s appeal lies in the fact that
judges “usually are happy to hand off responsibility for deciding to
another adjudicator.” 9 Formalism’s somber invocation of “higherlevel rules” masks an approach in which judges can defer to
decisions already made by lower-court judges, juries, legislatures,
and administrative agencies. 10
With limited lockstep, the decision comes ready-made from
the U.S. Supreme Court. Using lockstep requires no thinking from
state court judges. This has a deleterious effect. Because the
formalist judge “minimizes the occasions on which he has to base a
decision on his own notions of a sensible resolution of the case,” 11
his ability to consider the consequences of his decisions atrophies.
In Posner’s words, “[j]udges’ belief that they don’t make law dulls
their critical faculties.” 12
People v. Fitzpatrick is an example of how the Illinois courts
use the formalist doctrine of lockstep to avoid having to consider
whether its decision is fair or even desirable. 13 In Fitzpatrick,
Officer Kehrli observed the defendant walking down the middle of
a street in Zion. 14 State law makes it an offense to walk on a
4. Hon. John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious Lockstep Doctrine
and the Future of Judicial Federalism in Illinois, 44. LOY. U. CHI . L.J. 965
(2013).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 4 (2013).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 106.
8. See id. (stating “[judges] like to say they just apply the law—given to
them, not created by them—to the facts.”
9. Id. at 124–25.
10. Id. at 111.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 122.
13. People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 29, aff’g People v.
Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463.
14. People v. Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463 at ¶ 2.
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roadway where a sidewalk is available. 15 This violation is
characterized as a petty offense. 16 For unexplained reasons, Kehrli
decided to arrest Fitzpatrick. 17 A brief pat-down at the scene
revealed no weapons. 18 Later at the police station, another officer
conducted a more extensive search and cocaine was discovered in
Fitzpatrick’s sock. 19 Fitzpatrick was charged and found guilty of
possession of a controlled substance. 20 On appeal, he argued that a
custodial arrest for a petty offense was unconstitutional and the
cocaine should have been suppressed. 21 The Second District
Appellate Court rejected this argument, and the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed. 22
The opinions in Fitzpatrick are devoid of any reason why
Officer Kehrli decided that an arrest, rather than a citation, was
appropriate to resolve this petty matter of walking in the street.
Kehrli testified that Fitzpatrick was not engaged in threatening
behavior, nor did it appear that he was armed. 23 There was no
evidence of the traffic conditions or the time of day. Additionally,
there was no evidence of whether Fitzpatrick was a member of a
minority and, if so, whether this may have affected Kehrli’s
decision to arrest. 24
Fitzpatrick conceded that the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that a custodial arrest for a petty offense is proper under the
Fourth Amendment. 25 Nonetheless, he contended that Illinois
courts should find that this practice violates the Illinois
Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 26
The Second District disagreed. 27 It noted that Illinois follows
a “limited lockstep” approach in the area of search and seizure. 28
Therefore, Illinois courts defer to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment unless “a specific
criterion—for example, unique state history or state experience—

15. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1007 (2010).
16. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-202 (2010).
17. Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463 at ¶ 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at ¶ 1.
21. Id.
22. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449 at ¶ 29.
23. Id. at ¶ 4.
24. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996) (holding that
even if an arrest had been racially motivated, this would not affect its
constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment).
25. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322 (2001).
26. ILL. CONST. OF 1970, art. I, § 6.
27. Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463 at ¶ 8.
28. Id. (citing Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 313).

328

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:325

justifies departure.” 29 Finding none, the Second District followed
lockstep and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater. 30
The most interesting part of the Second District’s opinion was
its response to Fitzpatrick’s contention that Atwater should be
rejected simply because it results in bad policy. Not only is an
arrest a draconian response to a minor offense, but the policy
allows for police to engage in racial profiling in deciding whom to
arrest. In fact, several states have relied on their own
constitutions to reject Atwater for these reasons, 31 and Fitzpatrick
asked the Illinois courts to do the same. 32
The Second District’s response is nothing short of astonishing,
holding that it was irrelevant whether Atwater made sense or not.
“[T]he lockstep doctrine would be largely meaningless if Illinois
courts interpreting state constitutional provisions followed only
those United States Supreme Court decisions with which they
agreed.” 33 It concluded by noting that “[t]he [Illinois Supreme
Court] did not suggest that a ‘flawed federal analysis’ would
ordinarily be a valid basis for departing from United States
Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, we will not conduct an
independent analysis of the question settled in Atwater.” 34
Recall Posner’s characterization of legal formalism as
insisting that “the law made me do it.” 35 Here, an Illinois court is
actually refusing to consider the fairness of a decision because a
self-imposed “rule” says it cannot. In the court’s view, it would not
be a “real rule” if we only accepted its fair and just results. The
only way to apply a “real rule” is to unquestioningly accept its
unjust and unfair results, too.
In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus asked his crew to tie him to
the mast to prevent him from giving into the temptation of the
Sirens’ songs designed to make him run his ship aground. 36

29. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 309 (quoting Lawrence Friedman, The
Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 104 (2000)).
30. Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463 at ¶ 12.
31. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-3931, ¶ 7 (holding that the Ohio
Constitution provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment under
O HIO CONST., art. 1, § 14); State v, Bayard, 119 Nev. 241, 247 (2003) (holding
that the Nevada Constitution affords its citizens broader protection under
NEV . CONST., art. 1, § 18); State v. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 24 (finding
that the New Mexico Constitution provides its citizens greater protection than
the Federal Constitution under N.M. CONST., art. 2, § 10).
32. Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463 at ¶ 3.
33. Id. at ¶ 12.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING, supra note 5, at 4.
36. Homer, The Odyssey, in 22 THE HARVARD CLASSICS BK. XII 170–74
(Charles W. Eliot LLD ed., S.H. Butcher & A Lang trans., P.F. Colier & Son
Co. 1909) (circa 700 BCE). “Friends, forasmuch as in sorrow we are not all
unlearned, truly this is no greater woe than upon us . . . yet even thence we
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Bizarrely, Illinois courts use the self-imposed restraints of the
“lockstep doctrine” to prevent themselves from giving into the
temptation to issue the best decision possible.
Voluntarily locking yourself into a position with the purpose
of preventing a fair and just result turns deference to the U.S.
Supreme Court into judicial theater of the absurd. To understand
why, first review the legal principles involved. As the U.S.
Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]he federal system rests on what
might at first seem a counterintuitive insight, that ‘freedom is
enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one.’” 37 In the
federal system, criminal justice is a realm that has traditionally
been exercised at the state level. 38 Historically, the Court had
little to do with state issues of criminal justice until the Warren
Court began to “selectively incorporate” the governmental
restrictions of the federal Bill of Rights in the 1960s. 39 The Court’s
decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment are relevant in state
courts only to the extent that they set a “constitutional floor,” i.e.,
guarantee that no state grants fewer rights to its citizens than the
basic minimum required under the U.S. Constitution. 40 Although
the Court lays the floor, each individual state is free to decide how
high the “constitutional ceiling” is in that state, i.e., how many
more rights it decides to grant to its citizens under its own law. 41
This is the genius of the federal system. Justice Antonin Scalia
recently reminded us that “[t]he Constitution . . . is not an allpurpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world.” 42 The
federal Bill of Rights merely establishes a constitutional
minimum; each state is then free to go beyond that minimum to
create a system that it considers perfect for itself. 43
The problem with “limited lockstep” is that the Illinois courts
erroneously view a Fourth Amendment decision from the U.S.
Supreme Court as providing the only correct answer, when it is
merely providing a constitutional minimum. 44 It is true that when
the Court issues a pro-defense Fourth Amendment decision, it is
setting common restrictions on the power of both state and federal
made escape by my manfulness, even by my counsel and my wit, and some day
I think that this adventure too we shall remember.” Id. at 174.
37. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (quoting Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999)).
38. YALE K AMISAR, ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 18 (12th ed.
2008). States account for roughly 96% of all felony prosecutions and 99% of all
misdemeanor prosecutions. Id.
39. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIM . PRO. § 2.6(c) (3d ed.).
40. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997).
41. See Florida v. Rigterink, 559 U.S. 965 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court improperly vacated the judgment, because
the case could have been adequately decided on state law).
42. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904.
44. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59 (2010).
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government. It is also true that the Supremacy Clause forbids any
state from removing any of these restrictions no matter how
flawed it may consider the decision. 45
But when the U.S. Supreme Court issues a pro-prosecution
Fourth Amendment decision, it is not telling a state what it must
do. The Court is merely telling a state what it is not compelled to
do. 46 This is another way of saying that our federal system always
permits a state to provide more rights to its people, i.e., place more
restrictions on itself, through state law than the minimum
required under the Fourth Amendment. 47 What a state cannot do
is provide fewer rights to its people, i.e., place fewer restrictions on
itself, than the minimum required under the Fourth
Amendment. 48
In this sense, the Fitzpatrick court was half-right. True, it is
compelled to accept even what it considers a flawed decision from
the U.S. Supreme Court to the extent that Illinois is not free to
grant fewer rights than provided. However, a state is always free
to reject what it considers a flawed U.S. Supreme Court decision
that does not grant as many rights to its people as its own state
law does. 49
There is nothing controversial about any of this. It all comes
from first-year law school. But even apart from “lockstep,” Illinois
courts can seem unclear on what they “must” and “need not” do
under the federal system.
Consider the 2008 case from the Fourth District, People v.
Loewenstein. 50 The police went to the home of a convicted felon
and violated Miranda v. Arizona by interrogating him without
proper warnings. 51 The defendant made incriminating statements
about possession of a handgun. 52 The next day they interrogated
him at the police station. 53 After proper Miranda warnings and a
waiver, he made more incriminating statements. 54
The defense, viewing this as one continuous incident, moved
to suppress both sets of statements. 55 However, the prosecution
cited Oregon v Elstad, 56 a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that
45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
46. Powell, 559 U.S. at 59.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. People v. Loewenstein, 378 Ill. App. 3d 984 (4th Dist. 2008).
51. Id. at 987.
52. Id. at 986.
53. Id. at 987.
54. Id. at 988.
55. Id. at 985–86.
56. See id. at 989–90 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) for
the proposition that an initial confession obtained in violation of Miranda does
not necessarily invalidate a legitimate confession obtained after a valid set of
warnings).

2014]

Why “Li mited Lockstep” Betr ays Our Syste m of Feder alism

331

the two interrogations could be bifurcated and the statements at
the police station should be admitted. In deciding this issue, the
Fourth District Appellate Court simply held, “we find the facts in
this case require us to follow Elstad.” 57
This is wrong. An Illinois court is never “required” to follow a
pro-prosecution decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. 58 What is
frustrating is that by insisting it has to follow Elstad, the court
refused to even discuss the crucial question: does it believe this is
a fair and just result? The Fourth District never says. This brings
to mind Judge Posner’s comment that the formalist judge’s critical
capacities atrophy when he sees his job as merely applying other
judges’ decisions. 59
This fetish for insisting that the U.S. Constitution provides
the one true answer to an issue has deeper cultural roots. Garrett
Epps argues that the way Americans read the Constitution reflects
how some Americans read the Bible. 60
Epps notes that historically there was no single way of
interpreting the Bible. 61 The so-called “higher criticism” analyzed
the Bible as a human work of literature. 62 Higher critics studied
Bible stories the way they studied non-Christian myths, and
refused to accept them as literal truth. 63
But Epps notes that a change occurred five centuries ago.
“The idea of a single, literal, intended meaning [of the Bible]
gained primacy only during the Reformation.” 64 For Americans,
this “general Protestant notion of ‘original intent’” was
strengthened when the movement we call “Fundamentalism”
adopted the concept that what the Bible says is literally true. 65
Epps contends, “[s]o influential has Fundamentalism been in this
country that these attitudes are now cultural, rather than
specifically religious, values. Many Americans profoundly believe
that the Framers in Philadelphia made no mistakes or
omissions.” 66
This interpretational rigidity can morph into the “lockstep”
view that the U.S. Supreme Court’s understanding of the
57. Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
58. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013–14 (1983) (reasoning
that “[i]t is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in
their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires”).
59. REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING, supra note 5, at 111.
60. G ARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC: READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(2013).
61. Id. at xiv.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at xv. See also, JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004) (comparing and contrasting interpretations of
these documents).
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Constitution should conclusively determine state law as well as
federal law. Yet a federal system sees no virtue in uniformity per
se. The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed this point by
noting that the interest in uniformity:
[D]oes not outweigh the general principle that States are
independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make
and enforce their own laws as long as they do not
infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The
fundamental
interest in federalism that allows
individual states to define crimes, punishments, rules of
evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a
variety of different ways—so long as they do not violate
the Federal Constitution—is not otherwise limited by
any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity.
Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in a
federal system of government. 67
“Lockstep” provides for mindless, formalist uniformity. When
a state uses “lockstep” it is actually abdicating its role in our
federal system. Lawyers are familiar with Justice Louis Brandeis’s
characterization of a state as a “laboratory” in which the
government may “try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.” 68 Interestingly, Timothy
Ferris has recently argued that using such as “experiment” and
“laboratory” to describe the workings of American government is
more than just rough metaphor. 69
Ferris asserts that there is a symbiotic relationship between
science and democracy: “the freedoms protected by liberal
democracies are essential to facilitating scientific inquiry, and that
democracy itself is an experimental system.” 70 He quotes the late
physicist Richard Feynman on the continuing importance of
experimentation in our federal system of democracy:
The government of the United States was developed
under the idea that nobody knew how to make a
government, or how to govern. The result is to invent a
system to govern when you don’t know how. And the way
to arrange it is to permit a system, like we have, wherein
new ideas can be developed and tried out and thrown
away. 71

67. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008).
68. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
69. TIMOTHY FERRIS, THE SCIENCE OF LIBERTY 2–3 (2010).
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 104–05.
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“Lockstep” effectively short-circuits the entire system by
accepting a provisional answer from the U.S. Supreme Court as
being “Truth” with a capital T. Experiments require thought and
energy and imagination. “Lockstep” is an intellectually lazy path
pretending no more work is necessary because the “Truth” has
already been conclusively established by the United States
Supreme Court.
The Federalist Papers abound with references to political
science terms. Yet it is significant that the word “experiment” is
used 45 times. 72 When the Illinois Supreme Court allows the U.S.
Supreme Court to almost always 73 have the final say on search
and seizure issues, it is not doing its job. Every time it applies
“lockstep,” it turns its back on the legal experimentation the
Constitution’s framers expected states to perform in a federal
system.
In 1941, Erich Fromm wrote a book contending that people do
not see freedom as an unalloyed good 74 because freedom comes
with
responsibilities
that
can
seem
overwhelming. 75
Unfortunately, faced with this angst, people may find
authoritarianism to be an attractive alternative. 76 The book is
titled Escape from Freedom. 77
On a different level, the dual sovereignty found in our federal
system provides state courts with freedom to formulate their own
answers to issues such as what is an unreasonable search and
seizure, what offends due process, and what violates equal
protection. But with freedom comes responsibility. And
responsibility can seem overwhelming. One way to deal with this
is to refuse to make difficult choices and to rely on ready-made
interpretations from the U.S. Supreme Court. But this is not the
72. THE FEDERALISTS NOS. 12, 22, 23, 24, 29, 34, 35, 36, 60, 61, 67, 79,
85 (Alexander Hamilton), 2 (John Jay), 14, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 46 (James
Madison), 18, 19, 20 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison), 49, 50, 57, 63
(Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
73. See People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60, 74–75 (1996) (refusing to adopt
the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) on
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary rule because the Illinois Exclusionary
rule goes back to People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (1923), which predated the
adoption of the current Illinois Constitution in 1970).
74. See ERICH FROMM , ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 103 (1st ed. 1941)
(finding that “freedom from the traditional bonds of medieval society, though
giving the individual a new feeling of independence, at the same time made
him feel alone and isolated, filled with doubt and anxiety, and drove him into
new submission and into a compulsive and irrational activity.” (Emphasis in
original).
75. See id. at 141 (stating that “the tendency is to give up the
independence of one’s own individual self and to fuse one’s self with somebody
or something outside of oneself [sic] in order to acquire strength which the
individual self is lacking”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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way the federal system was intended to work. State courts must
resist the temptation to “escape from freedom.” The ongoing
American experiment in federalism deserves nothing less.

